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ADOLESCENT DECISION
MAKING: REDUCED
CULPABILITY IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM AND
RECOGNITION OF CAPABILITY
IN OTHER LEGAL CONTEXTS
SAMANTHA SCHAD
INTRODUCTION
Adolescence is a confusing and awkward period between childhood
and adulthood.' Just as adolescence is characterized by irregularity and
transition, the rules governing adolescent autonomy and responsibility are
likewise inconsistent, varying between different legal realms. 2 Youth
advocates often fight for adolescents to be held to a reduced standard of
responsibility within the criminal justice system, but for increased
autonomy in medical decision making. 3 Others believe the exact opposite:
that adolescents should be held to the same standards as adults within the
criminal justice system, but have little or no autonomy in medical decision
making.4
Copyright © Samantha Schad 2011.
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1. Ronald E. Dahl, Adolescent Brain Development: A Period of Vulnerabilities and
Opportunities, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. ScL. 1, 9-10 (2004).
2. Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Minor Discrepancies: Forging a Common Understanding of
Adolescent Competence in Healthcare Decision-Making and Criminal Responsibility, 58 Juv. &
FAM. CT. J. 1, 1 (2007).
3. Id. at 1-2.
4. Id. (describing the range of views regarding how much decision making power an
adolescent should have); see also Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Whose Body is it Anyway? An
Updated Model of Healthcare Decision-Making Rights for Adolescents, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 251, 252-53 (2005) (explaining that healthcare laws depict protection of young people
from themselves by leaving healthcare decision making rights to parents).
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This comment proposes that adolescents receive mitigated treatment in
the criminal justice system, but be given more autonomy when making
medical decisions, specifically end-of-life decisions. This proposal is
supported by recent research of experts in the fields of neuroscience and
developmental psychology.5 Recent research suggests that adolescents
demonstrate varying decision making capacities depending on the context
of the situation. 6 Researchers believe that youth attain mature cognitive
skills by middle adolescence.7 Adolescents can employ these cognitive
skills to make important decisions under structured and controlled
circumstances. 8 On the other hand, research also indicates that adolescents
are psychosocially immature, making it difficult for them to perceive future
consequences and increasing their susceptibility to risk-taking and
impulsivity. 9 When forced to make quick decisions, psychosocial
immaturity can lead to bad decision making.' 0 This is especially relevant in
the criminal context when most decisions to commit crime happen
quickly."
This comment will analyze the deficiencies and capabilities of
adolescent decision making in two significant legal contexts: criminal
responsibility and end-of-life decision making.12 The circumstances
surrounding decision making in the criminal context breed impulsive and
risky decision making.13 In contrast, the circumstances surrounding end-of-
life decision making are more structured and informative; thus, the
tendency for adolescent impulsivity is not as much of a concern.14
Accordingly, because the circumstances between the two types of decisions
vary, the law should credit adolescents with greater respect for their
decision making capacities in the medical decision making context than in
the criminal context. 15
Part I provides background on current neuroscience and psychology
studies and discusses how adolescent brain development relates to risk-
taking and impulsivity.16 Part II discusses the legal implications of
impulsivity and rationality for adolescents within the criminal justice
5. See infra Part 1.A-B.
6. See infra Part l.A-B.
7. See infra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part Ill.
12. See infra Parts II-III.
13. See infra Part Ill.
14. See infra Part Ill.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part I.
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system and in the end-of-life decision making contexts.17 Part III builds on
the work of other scholars who have pointed out that mitigated criminal
responsibility and increased health care decision making for adolescents can
be rationalized by looking at the very different factual and emotional
contexts and the different societal interests involved in these types of
decisions by specifically focusing on end-of-life decision making.i 8
I. EFFECT OF BRAIN DEVELOPMENT ON ADOLESCENT DECISION MAKING
A. Current Status ofAdolescent Neuroscience and Psychology Studies
Adolescence is the period from ages twelve through seventeen, when a
young adult matures into adulthood. 19 Aside from physical maturation
during adolescence, 20 the brain also matures. 21 During this time, the
adolescent brain undergoes dramatic changes. 22 Professor Laurence
Steinberg, a well-known researcher on adolescent cognitive development,
proposes that these changes occur in two systems: the socioemotional
system and the cognitive control system.23 According to Steinberg, the
socioemotional system "is localized in limbic and paralimbic areas of the
brain ... "24 The socioemotional system is responsible for the processing
of emotions and balancing of reward versus punishment. 25 The cognitive
control system is located in the prefrontal cortex, with further localization
in the lateral prefrontal cortex.26 The cognitive control system has been
attributed to higher executive functioning activities such as impulse control,
future orientation and deliberation. 27 The interplay between the two systems
influences adolescent risk-taking. 28
17. See infra Part 11.
18. See infra Part Ill.
19. Charles Geier & Beatriz Luna, The Maturation of Incentive Processing and Cognitive
Control, 93 PHARMACOLOGY, BIOCHEMISTRY & BEHAV. 212, 212 (2009).
20. See B.J. Casey, Sarah Getz & Adriana Galvan, The Adolescent Brain, 28 DEV. REV. 62,
70 (2008) (defining adolescence as a transitional time marked by puberty).
21. Geier & Luna, supra note 19, at 215.
22. Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV.
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 47, 54 (2009).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id
27. Id.
28. Praveen Kambam & Christopher Thompson, The Development of Decision-Making
Capacities in Children and Adolescents: Psychological and Neurological Perspectives and Their
Implications for Juvenile Defendants, 27 BEHAv. SCi. & L. 173, 176 (2009); Laurence Steinberg
et al., Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed by Behavior and Self-
Report: Evidence for a Dual Systems Model, 44 DEv. PSYCHOL. 1764, 1764 (2008).
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Although everyone is prone to reward seeking, this tendency is
especially important for adolescents. 29 This is because adolescents
experience increases in reward seeking, which translates into vulnerability
for risky behavior.30 Puberty causes a restructuring of dopamine levels
within the brain and "dopamingeric activity in the prefrontal cortex
increases significantly in early adolescence." 3 1 Dopamine is "a key
monoamine neurotransmitter modulating reward circuitry" and "has been
associated with multiple aspects of reward processing. . ."32 Dopamine
influences reward seeking, strongly motivating individuals to seek rewards
or engage in rewarding behavior.33 By adulthood, cognitive capacity for
impulse control fully develops. 34 This self-regulation, in conjunction with
memory and experience, makes an adult better equipped to resist impulses
towards reward seeking.35
The adolescent brain seems particularly sensitive to increases in
dopamine.36 For adolescents the increase of dopamine occurs before the
control systems in the prefrontal cortex mature.37 Furthermore, adolescent
youth and lack of experience, makes this group less aware of risks.38
"Because dopamine plays a critical role in the brain's reward circuitry, the
increase, reduction, and redistribution of dopamine receptor concentration
during puberty, especially in projections from the limbic system to the
prefrontal area, is likely to increase reward seeking behavior and
accordingly, sensation seeking." 39 Increased reward seeking occurs prior to
the full maturation of the cognitive control system. 40 It also occurs before
29. Kambam & Thompson, supra note 28, at 176.
30. Id
31. Steinberg, supra note 22, at 54.
32. Geier & Luna, supra note 19, at 216.
33. See Steinberg, supra note 22, at 54 (describing that "dopamine plays a critical role in the
brain's reward circuitry ... likely to increase reward-seeking behavior and, accordingly, sensation
seeking.").
34. Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-Taking, 28
DEv. REV. 78, 99 (2008).
35. See id. (explaining that an adult with a fully developed cognitive control network is better
able to resist emotional arousal). See also Geier and Luna, supra note 19, at 217 (pointing out that
higher-level cognitive skills can be attributed to improvement in working memory and that
deficiencies "in working memory would be predicted to limit adolescents' ability" in reward
processing). See also Abigail A. Baird & Jonathan A. Fugelsang, The Emergence of
Consequential Thought: Evidence from Neuroscience, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y
LONDON B. 1797, 1800 (describing that adolescents' reasoning abilities increase with experience,
working memory and the ability to draw from past experience to make broader generalizations).
36. Kambam & Thompson, supra note 28, at 176-77.
37. Casey, Getz & Galvan, supra note 20, at 69-70.
38. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 163 (1997).
39. Steinberg, supra note 22, at 54; Steinberg et al., supra note 28, at 1765.
40. Kambam & Thompson, supra note 28, at 176; Steinberg et al., supra note 28, at 1764.
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connections between the limbic system and prefrontal cortex are forged. 41
The simultaneous increase in reward seeking, as well as the developmental
disparity between the cognitive control system and the limbic and
paralimbic regions makes adolescents susceptible to greater risk-taking than
adults.42
While reward seeking becomes more prevalent during adolescence, the
brain also undergoes processes that strengthen the ability to self-regulate
and ignore reward seeking impulses.43 These processes are known as
synaptic pruning and myelination and increase connectivity between the
limbic and paralimbic regions and the prefrontal cortex of the cognitive
control system.44 Synaptic pruning removes weak or unused synapses and
"promotes enhanced information processing capacity, speed and overall
efficiency and supports complex computations within regional circuitry."45
Myelination is the process of insulating brain cell axons with myelin,46
which "enhances the efficiency of information processing by increasing the
speed and fidelity of distal neuronal transmission . . . critical for the
emergence of complex cognitive behavior."47 Synaptic pruning and
myelination are important because they enhance adolescent brain
processing and cognitive control.48 Synaptic pruning declines by age
sixteen, 49 but the process of myelination continues into adulthood.50 These
processes improve the cognitive control system by linking brain circuitry.5'
Professor Steinberg notes:
41. Kambam & Thompson, supra note 28, at 177; Steinberg et al., supra note 28, at 1764.
42. Kambam & Thompson, supra note 28, at 176; Steinberg et al., supra note 28, at 1764.
43. Steinberg et al., supra note 28, at 1765.
44. Geier & Luna, supra note 19, at 215-16.
45. Id. at 216.
46. Brief for Am. Psychological Ass'n & Mo. Psychological Ass'n as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 437, at *26.
47. Geier & Luna, supra note 19, at 216.
48. See id. at 215-16 (noting that "[t]hese processes enhance neuronal processing and
support mature cognitive control of behavior.").
49. Steinberg, supra note 22, at 54-55.
50. Id. at 55. See also Geier & Luna, supra note 19, at 216 (describing that an "under-
myclinated brain would be expected to undermine adolescents' ability to have efficient and rapid
access to incentive signals as well as limit how rapidly these signals may be integrated and used to
inform decision-making and guide behavior.").
51. Laurence Steinberg, Risk Taking in Adolescence: New Perspectives from Brain and
Behavioral Science, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. Sci. 55, 57 (2007). See also Casey, Getz
& Galvan, supra note 20, at 66 (noting that "regions subserving primary functions, such as motor
and sensory systems, mature earliest; higher-order association areas, which integrate these primary
functions, mature later"); Kambam & Thompson, supra note 28, at 177 ("This is consistent with
findings of age-related structural and functional changes in the prefrontal cortex and improved
coordination of emotion and cognition resulting from improved neural connectivity.").
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Because of synaptic pruning and the continued myelination
of prefrontal brain regions, resulting in improved
connectivity among cortical areas and between cortical and
subcortical areas, there are improvements over the course
of adolescence in many aspects of executive function, such
as response inhibition, planning, weighing risks and
rewards, and the simultaneous consideration of multiple
sources of information.52
Thus, synaptic pruning and myelination are important because for decisions
requiring cognitive skills, "and where improvement in adolescence is likely
due to synaptic pruning of the frontal lobes, adolescents evince adult levels
of competence by age 16.
B. Adolescent Tendency for Risk-Taking and Impulsive Decision Making
"Decision making" is a process that does not have a single definition.
It continues to be the subject of research and is not fully understood. For
purposes of this comment, I rely on the model set forth by Laurence
Steinberg and Elizabeth Scott. According to their research, decision making
is influenced by a person's "maturity of judgment" which can be broken
down into two facets: cognitive capacity and psychosocial factors. 54
Cognitive capacity "shapes the process of decision making," 55 and includes:
"understanding (i.e., the ability to comprehend information relevant to the
decision) and reasoning (i.e., the ability to use this information logically to
make a choice)." 56 Furthermore, cognitive capacity involves the processing
of information, deliberative thinking, and logical reasoning. 57
On the other hand, psychosocial factors influence the actual outcome
of the decision. 58 Psychosocial factors include acceptance by peers,
impulsivity, preference toward short term outcomes over long term
52. Steinberg, supra note 22, at 54.
53. Id at 55.
54. See Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in
Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCL & L. 741, 743
(2000) (stating that "cognitive and psychosocial differences are assumed to result in differences in
'maturity of judgment,' a term we use here to refer to the complexity and sophistication of the
process of individual decision-making as it is affected by a range of cognitive, emotional, and
social factors.").
55. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1012 (2003).
56. Steinberg, supra note 22, at 55.
57. Id
58. Steinberg & Scott, supra note 55, at 1012.
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outcomes and underestimating risks. 59 Often these psychosocial factors
affect an adolescent's perspective on a situation, or how he or she may
perceive a situation. 60 Consequently, this affects the adolescent's decision
making process. 61 Because decision making is affected by these factors,
adolescents are often less likely to think about alternative decisions and
curtail impulsivity. 62 As noted earlier, an adolescent's cognitive skills are
fairly mature by age sixteen, 63 however, because adolescents are more
prone to psychosocial immaturity, they tend to be less mature than adults
when it comes to their judgment and decision making capacity. 64
The following simple example demonstrates how cognitive capacity
and psychosocial factors affect the decision making process: 65 Imagine that
a teenager is at the mall shopping with some of her friends. She wants to
buy a new pair of sunglasses, but does not have the money. One friend
suggests that she steal the glasses. As her friends begin to leave the store,
she impulsively puts the sunglasses in her purse. She exits the store and the
alarm goes off. Because adolescent cognitive skills mature before an
adolescent becomes psychosocially mature, this teenager had the cognitive
skills to know that stealing is against the law. She also had the cognitive
capacity to know that it is wrong. However, at the moment she puts the
sunglasses in her purse, she is not thinking about the future consequences of
her actions. She does not think about going to jail or appearing in front of a
judge. She is only thinking about the immediate reward of having the
glasses she cannot afford. She is thinking about impressing her friends. She
is not considering five minutes from now when she will be sitting in a
police car waiting for her parents to pick her up. While she may have the
cognitive capacity to make the right decision, her judgment is impaired by
the factors of psychosocial immaturity.
The fact that cognitive decision making capacity matures by sixteen
reveals why many adolescents have adult-level cognitive decision making
59. Steinberg, supra note 22, at 56. See also Kambam & Thompson, supra note 28, at 175
(describing that psychosocial factors can negatively impact an adolescent's capacity to make
decisions).
60. See Steinberg, supra note 22, at 56 (noting that different psychosocial factors affect the
adolescent thought process).
61. Id.
62. Brief for Am. Psychological Ass'n & Mo. Psychological Ass'n as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, supra note 46, at *20.
63. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
64. Steinberg, supra note 22, at 56; Steinberg & Scott, supra note 55, at 1012 (describing that
psychosocial immaturity impairs adolescent decision making capacity). See also Cauffman &
Steinberg, supra note 54, at 743 (noting that social and emotional factors impact decision making
outcomes).
65. This hypothetical is modeled after an example presented by Scott & Grisso, supra note
38, at 166.
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capacity. 66 Contrarily, decision making that requires the interaction of both
the cognitive and the limbic systems, does not fully mature until the process
of myelination (the connecting of all regions of the brain) is complete.67
Steinberg asserts that "[r]ecent studies of the neural underpinnings of
resistance to peer influence in adolescence indicate that improvements in
this capacity may be linked to the development of greater connectivity
between cortical and subcortical regions, which likely facilitates the better
coordination of affect and cognition." 68 Therefore, because cognitive
capacity develops before an adolescent becomes psychosocially mature,
"adolescents may be less able to deploy their cognitive capacities as
effectively as adults in exercising judgment in their everyday lives when
decisions are influenced by emotional and social variables." 69
Both impulsivity and sensation seeking are psychosocial factors that
can affect risk-taking. 70 Impulsivity refers to a low ability to self-regulate
and "deficiencies in response inhibition,"71 whereas sensation seeking is
defined as a willingness to take risks and participate in exhilarating
experiences. 72 Adolescent impulsivity is attributed to the developing
prefrontal cortex.73 A recent research study focused on adolescent
impulsivity found that impulsivity declines throughout adolescence. 74 The
study concluded that:
[t]he first half of the adolescent decade - between 10 and 15
- appears to be a time of growing vulnerability to risky
behavior, as this period is characterized by relatively higher
sensation seeking in the context of relatively lower impulse
66. See Steinberg, supra note 22, at 56 (emphasizing that adolescents' capacity for making
cognitive reasoning and logic based decisions does not mean they are similar to adults when it
comes to decision making that implicates psychosocial factors).
67. Id at 54-55 (noting that this difference in development causes many problems in
knowing when an adolescent is capable of decision making).
68. Id at 56.
69. Id.
70. Steinberg et al., supra note 28, at 1765.
71. Id
72. Id.
73. Casey, Getz & Galvan, supra note 20, at 72. The authors note that an adolescent's
impulsivity gradually declines as he or she matures into adulthood. Id.
74. See Steinberg et al., supra note 28, at 1774. This study was conducted in five different
states with participants between the ages of ten through thirty. Id. at 1766. Researchers
administered The Tower of London task to evaluate impulsivity among the group. Id. at 1768. The
Tower of London task is administered by providing the participant with stacks of colored balls and
empty rods. Id. The participant is then shown a picture that illustrates a specific arrangement of
colored balls. Id. The participant is asked to match their materials to the illustration in the least
amount of possible moves. Id. Researchers are able to evaluate impulse control because the task
involves a certain amount of thinking before completion, because extra moves must be used if a
mistake is made. Id
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control; heightened sensation seeking impels adolescents
toward risky activity, and immature self regulatory
capabilities do not restrain this impulse. 75
This study explicates that adolescents have a tendency towards impulsivity,
and that the under-developed regions of the brain make them vulnerable to
risky behavior.
II. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF ADOLESCENT RISK-TAKING
The idea that adolescent decision making capacity is influenced by
both psychology and neuroscience constructs leads to debate on the amount
of autonomy adolescents should be given in different legal contexts. 76
Certainly, many different views exist on how adolescents should be treated
within the criminal justice system and the medical decision making
context.77 Some advocates argue adolescents deserve lesser punishment in
the criminal justice system because adolescents are less mature than
adults.78 Others advocate that adolescents who commit adult crimes should
receive adult-like punishment. 79 Regarding medical decision making, many
argue that because adolescents' decision making is deficient compared to
that of adults, adolescents should not be given autonomy in medical
decision making. 80 Others advocate that adolescents can make rational
decisions in the medical arena and should be afforded that autonomy. 81
While there are strong views on all sides, many views overlap, especially
75. Id at 1776.
76. See infra Part II.A-B.
77. See infra Part II.A-C.
78. See infra Part II.A-B.
79. See Brief of the States of Alabama, Delaware, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Virginia as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 335. The states argue that 16 and 17-year-olds who commit heinous crimes
should be placed in adult court and subject to the death penalty. Id. at *3-4. The states advocate
this by providing examples of heinous crimes committed by teenagers in Alabama and argue that
these crimes deserve the death penalty. Id. The brief elaborates "[tihere simply is no basis to
conclude that 16- and 17-year-olds are categorically incapable of committing heinous (and
meticulously planned) murders, and there is no justification for categorically exempting them
from the death penalty." Id. at *4. See also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 618 (2005) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Court's decision and noting that "the studies cited by the
Court offer scant support for a categorical prohibition of the death penalty for murderers under
18."); Brief of the Nat'l Dist. Attorneys Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412, 08-7621), 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 952, at *1 (arguing that juvenile life in prison without the possibility of parole does not
violate the Eighth amendment because some juveniles are hardened criminals deserving of this
sentence).
80. See infra notes 144-150 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 176-182 and accompanying text.
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those of juvenile advocates who argue for lessened criminal responsibility,
but greater autonomy in other legal contexts.
A. Mitigated Adolescent Criminal Culpability in the Most Recent Supreme
Court Decisions
The notion that juveniles deserve different treatment than adults in the
criminal justice system has existed for a little over a century. 82 Prior to the
creation of a separate juvenile justice system, youth who committed crimes
were treated much the same as adults.83 Early juvenile courts were the
product of the 19'h century "child-saving movement." 84 Proponents of this
movement believed that rehabilitating youth would benefit not only the
youth, but also society. 85 As views shifted towards protecting youth, the
concept of parens patriae, meaning "parent of the country," allowed the
state to step in and provide supervision and control over delinquent youth.86
The separate criminal justice system for juveniles looks out for "the best
interests of the child" by focusing on the "protection and treatment of the
child and not for punishment." 87
While the values driving the creation of juvenile courts were primarily
rehabilitative, the emphasis on rehabilitation has slowly declined since the
late 1970s.88 The United States experienced an increase in juvenile crime
and violence in the late 1970s, and state legislatures responded with tougher
laws against juveniles. 89 These laws marked "[t]he movement away from
rehabilitation and treatment and toward retribution and just desserts . . . ."90
Child advocates fought for a separate system in the late 1 9 th century
focusing on rehabilitation and compassion for children. Today's child
advocates share these same ideals and still fight for mitigated criminal
responsibility. Recently, new research in neuroscience and psychology has
begun influencing the Supreme Court's treatment of adolescents.
In 2005, advocates for reduced juvenile culpability received a victory
in Roper v. Simmons,9 1 when the Supreme Court announced that it is
unconstitutional for juveniles to receive the death penalty.92 In its amicus
82. RICHARD LAWRENCE & MARIO HESSE, JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE ESSENTIALS 13 (2010).
83. Id. at 14.
84. Id. at 16.
85. Id
86. Id at 12.
87. Id at 16-17,20.
88. Id. at 21.
89. Id
90. Id at 22.
91. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
92. Id at 578-79.
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brief submitted in support of eliminating the death penalty for juveniles, the
American Psychological Association (APA) argued that "[d]evelopmentally
immature decision-making, paralleled by immature neurological
development, diminishes an adolescent's blameworthiness." 93 The APA
relied on a study demonstrating that adolescents performed much worse
than adults in their decision making competence and indicated that relative
to adults adolescents' were less able to consider alternative decisions. 94 The
APA stressed that neuroscience research demonstrates that the frontal lobes
controlling executive functioning are the last to develop in the adolescent
brain.95 This is significant because the lack of maturity in the frontal lobes
impacts how the adolescent views whether a decision is in his or her best
interests.96
Sixteen years earlier the Court had previously upheld subjecting
juveniles to the death penalty in Stanford v. Kentucky.97 In Stanford, the
Petitioners argued that "socioscientific" evidence demonstrated that
juveniles' cognitive skills are less mature than adults, making deterrence
less influential. 98 Nevertheless, the Stanford Court ultimately rejected using
scientific evidence to eliminate the death penalty for juveniles.99
Between Stanford and Roper the Supreme Court declared that
executing the mentally disabled was unconstitutional in Atkins v.
Virginia.'00 The Roper Court, like the Atkins Court, compared the national
disapproval of the juvenile death penalty to the disapproval of executing
mentally disabled individuals. 101 The Roper Court observed that many
states had already abandoned the juvenile death penalty.102 Furthermore,
new developments in neuroscience and psychology influenced the Court's
reasoning that clear differences exist between adolescents and adults.103
93. Brief for Am. Psychological Ass'n & Mo. Psychological Ass'n as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, supra note 46, at * 13.
94. Id. at *20-21 (citing Bonnie L. Halpern-Felsher & Elizabeth Cauffman, Costs and
Benefits of a Decision: Decision-Making Competence in Adolescents and Adults, 22 J. APPLIED
DEV. PSYCHOL. 257, 268, 271 (2001)) (referencing a study that demonstrates an adolescent's
competence to make mature decisions develops during the later stages of adolescence).
95. Id. at *24-25.
96. Id at *24.
97. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
98. Id at 377-78.
99. Id. at 378.
100. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
101. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (noting that the Atkins Court revisited
the issue of executing the mentally disabled following the decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302 (1989)).
102. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568.
103. Id. at 569 (noting that "as any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies
respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm, '[a] lack of maturity and an undeveloped sense of
2011] 385
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Focusing on scientific studies, as well as the amicus briefs submitted in
support of abolishing the juvenile death penalty, the Court held that
executing juveniles is cruel and unusual punishment.104
In differentiating between adolescents and adults, the Court noted that
adolescents are often perceived as immature and irresponsible,1 05
susceptible to peer pressure, 106 and have not yet attained the attributes of a
fully developed character. 107 "Their own vulnerability and comparative
lack of control over their immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a
greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative
influences." 08 The Roper Court further reasoned that the purposes of
retribution and deterrence behind the death penalty are not as compelling
when applied to juveniles.109 In its conclusion, the Court remarked that
"[t]he differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and
well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death
penalty despite insufficient culpability."' ll
Five years after Roper, juvenile advocates received another victory in
Graham v. Florida.11 In Graham, the Supreme Court held that imposing
juvenile life sentences without parole for non-homicide crimes is cruel and
unusual punishment and therefore violates the Eighth Amendment. 112 The
Graham Court began with the same analysis put forth in Roper, by
observing the nation's attitude towards juvenile life sentences without the
possibility of parole.11 3 Although hesitant to rely completely on the national
consensus, the Court noted that six states forbid life sentences without the
possibility parole for juvenile offenders. 1 14 The Court declared, however,
that despite the lack of legislation prohibiting this sentencing practice,
national disapproval is showcased by only 123 juveniles serving life
sentences without the possibility of parole for committing crimes other than
homicide. 115
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and more understandable among the
young."').
104. Id. at 568-70.
105. Id at 569.
106. Id
107. Id. at 570.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 571.
110. Id. at 572-73.
Ill. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). The decision was decided by a 6-3 vote, with Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito dissenting. Id, at 2017. Although similar to the outcome in Roper, the Roper
decision was more contentious with a 5-4 vote. Roper, 543 U.S. at 554.
112. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
113. Id. at 2023.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2023-24.
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Counsel for Graham, in both its brief and oral argument, focused on
the scientific studies demonstrating adolescent immaturity and
susceptibility to peer pressure. 116 Using these arguments as a foundation,
the Graham Court looked to the Roper Court's reasoning that adolescents
typically lack maturity and do not fully understand the consequences of
their actions. 117 During oral argument, Chief Judge Roberts conceded that,
"[w]e know that juveniles are not the worst of the worst, for the reasons you
have articulated, that they are not fully developed, [and] don't have moral
sense to the same extent as an adult."11 8 The Graham Court relied heavily
on the amicus briefs submitted in support of abolishing juvenile life
sentences without the possibility of parole.1 9 The Court noted that
"developments in psychology and brain science continue to show
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds."1 20 The Court
reasoned further that juvenile life sentences without the possibility of parole
are unconstitutional because the penological justifications of deterrence and
retribution are not met in the case of juvenile offenders. 121 This conclusion
was informed by Roper and also acknowledged that not only are juveniles
less culpable but "'the same characteristics that render juveniles less
culpable than adults suggest . . . that juveniles will be less susceptible to
deterrence."'122
Roper v. Simmons marked an enormous milestone for mitigating the
culpability of juveniles within the criminal justice system.123 Roper is an
important decision because it struck down the death penalty for crimes
committed by juveniles, but is also noteworthy for its reliance on
116. See generally Brief for Petitioner, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-
7412), 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 549. This argument was premised on the Roper Court's
findings and first argued that "juveniles possess less maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility, which often results in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions. Second,
juveniles are more vulnerable and susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures,
including peer pressure. Third, the personality and character traits of juveniles are less well-
formed and more transitory." Id. at *42. Petitioner further argued that juveniles have psychosocial
immaturity, are prone to risk-taking, and have difficulty controlling impulses. Id. at *58-60. See
also Transcript of Oral Argument, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412), 2009
U.S. Trans. LEXIS 62, at *12 (noting that "adolescents are different").
117. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
118. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 116, at *18.
119. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026. The Court cited the American Medical Association and
American Psychological Association amicus briefs submitted in support of the ban on juvenile life
sentences without parole. Id.
120. Id
121. Id at 2028-30.
122. Id at 2028 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005)).
123. Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults? Minors' Access to
Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA "Flip-Flop ", 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
583, 583 (2009).
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psychology and neuroscience studies. 124 The Supreme Court again relied on
psychology and neuroscience studies when it declared life sentences
without the possibility of parole unconstitutional in Graham v. Florida, and
similarly recognized the lessened culpability of adolescents. 125 Following
Roper, commentary debated whether science would inform the Court's
future decision making in cases involving adolescents. 126 The Court's
decision in Graham and continued reliance on adolescent brain
development demonstrated that the use of neuroscience in Roper was not
merely accidental. In the future, support for neuroscience and psychology
will most likely continue to influence the Court's reasoning regarding
juvenile punishment, and may also begin to affect other areas of juvenile
law. 12 7
124. Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice,
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 108 (2009). Although Roper was the first time the Supreme Court
applied psychological studies to the area of juvenile law, the Court relied on psychology in the
landmark decision Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1953). The Brown Court
focused on the psychological impact and social stigma that would affect segregated children. Id
The Court relied on several psychological studies submitted in support of this assertion. Id at n.
11.
125. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
126. See generally Maroney, supra note 124, at 93, 108, 176 (arguing that developmental
science will have a minimal impact on juvenile justice).
127. On January 25, 2011, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania heard oral arguments in
Commonwealth v. Brown. Sadie Gurman, Lack of Remorse Key Factor in Case; Superior Court
Reviewing Decision to Try Boy as Adult in Fatal Shooting, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 26,
2011, at Bl. Jordan Brown was eleven when he was automatically charged as an adult in the
double homicide of his future stepmother and her unborn child. Commonwealth v. Brown, No.
320 of 2009, CR., slip op. at 2 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 29, 2010), available at
http://www.jlc.org/images/uploads/Decisionrepre-adjudicatorymotion.pdf. Common Pleas
Court President Judge Motto denied Jordan Brown's petition for transfer to juvenile court on
March 29, 2010. Commonwealth v. Brown, No. 320 of 2009, CR. (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 29,
2010) (order denying petition for transfer). Following a motion to amend this order to allow for an
interlocutory appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Judge Motto amended the order. Brief
for Appellant at 6-7, Commonwealth v. Brown, No. 1159 WDA 2010 (Pa. Super. Ct.), available
at http://www.jlc.org/images/uploads/Decision_re pre-adjudicatorymotion.pdf. Surprisingly, the
interlocutory appeal brief does not mention developmental science or the recent Supreme Court's
decision in Graham v. Florida, but instead argues that the trial court misinterpreted and
misapplied the juvenile transfer statute in violation of Jordan Brown's constitutional rights. Id. at
8. The amicus brief written in support of Jordan Brown, however, focuses on the neurological and
psychological deficiencies of juveniles relative to adults and argues that these same deficiencies
make juveniles amendable to rehabilitation. See generally Brief of the Campaign for Youth Justice
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 12-18, No. 1159 WDA 2010 (Pa. Super. Ct.),
available at http://www.jlc.org/images/uploads/Jordan Brownamicus brief.pdf. The lower
court's order was issued before the Supreme Court issued the Graham v. Florida decision. On
March 11, 2011, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated the lower court's decision that
refused to decertify Jordan Brown's case to juvenile court finding that his Fifth Amendment rights
against self-incrimination had been violated. Commonwealth v. Brown, 2011 Pa Super 47 (Pa.
Super. Ct.), available at http://www.jlc.org/images/uploads/opinion of superior court_-_brown_-
3-11-1 l.pdf. The Court noted that although an "informative and enlightening" amicus brief
focused on neurological and psychological studies was submitted in support of Jordan Brown, the
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B. An Argument that Impulsivity and Sensation Seeking Cannot Be Deterred
The American criminal justice system recognizes that individuals who
commit crimes have varying levels of blameworthiness. 128 Although there
are some situations where "culpability is mitigated when the actor's
decision-making capacity is diminished, when the criminal act was coerced,
or when the act was out of character[,]"l 29 there is hesitation to reduce
culpability based on mental differences. 130 In Roper v. Simmons, the
Supreme Court articulated that juveniles and adults are very different. 13 1
These differences include increased risk-taking and deficient impulse
control which result in an adolescent's diminished culpability in the
criminal justice system.132
Some utilitarians would argue against diminished adolescent
culpability in the criminal justice system based on an adolescent's inability
to control impulses.1 33 The crux of this argument is that the social cost
caused by crime outweighs any potential differences exhibited between
adolescents and adults. 134 Proponents of lessened criminal culpability for
juveniles argue the opposite.135 For example, the APA's amicus brief in
brief was not considered because the trial court did not have an opportunity to review it. Id. at 7, n.
3. It will be interesting whether or not the trial court will consider the studies outlined in the
amicus brief. Otherwise, Jordan Brown, if convicted in Pennsylvania adult court, will become the
youngest individual to receive a sentence of life without parole. Press Release, Pennsylvania
Superior Court Says Judge Infringed on Fifth Amendment Rights of 11 Year Old Jordan Brown
(March 14, 2011), available at
http://www.jlc.org/images/uploads/JuvenileLawCenterPressReleaseJordanBrownSuperior
Court opinion.pdf.
128. Steinberg, supra note 22, at 59; Steinberg & Scott, supra note 55, at 1010.
129. Steinberg & Scott, supra note 55, at 1009.
130. See id. at 1010 (noting that debate on the mitigation of juvenile culpability results from
the mistaken belief that the only two alternatives are increased punishment or no punishment at
all). See also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306-07 (2002) (describing the difficulty of making
mentally disabled persons accountable for their actions, but at the same time recognizing their
deficiencies).
131. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005).
132. Id.
133. See generally Mutcherson, supra note 2, at 10 (noting that despite the relative differences
between adolescents and adults, utilitarians argue for harsh sanctions against juvenile offenders
because of the social harm juvenile crime causes); see also Scott & Grisso, supra note 38, at 139
(critiquing utilitarian views of all juvenile offenders as career criminals).
134. Scott & Grisso, supra note 38, at 139.
135. Brief for Juvenile Law Ctr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Graham v.
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412, 08-7621), 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 659, at
*44-45; see also Scott & Grisso, supra note 38, at 139, 179 (suggesting that greater social harm
will result from treating juveniles punitively).
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Roper questioned the deterrent value that the death penalty has on juveniles
due to their impulsivity and failure to recognize long-term consequences.136
The Atkins v. Virginia decision also supports the belief that harsh
punishment has no deterrent effect on deficient impulse control. 137 In
Atkins, the Supreme Court struck down the death penalty as
unconstitutional for mentally disabled people.138 The Court reasoned that
because the mentally disabled "have diminished capacities to understand
and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and
learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses,
and to understand the reactions of others" they should be treated differently
than the average criminal. 139 Further, the Court recognized that the death
penalty would serve no deterrent effect because the cognitive and
behavioral deficiencies that mitigate culpability for the mentally disabled
are the same deficiencies that make it unlikely that this type of punishment
will have any impact on them when they engage in crime.140
Relying on Atkins' articulation of mitigated culpability, the Roper
Court recognized that "the same characteristics that render juveniles less
culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to
deterrence." 141 Research demonstrates that adolescents tend to act
impulsively, engage in risk-taking, and do not fully consider the
consequences of their actions.142 These psychosocial factors are virtually
the same characteristics the Supreme Court found compelling in Atkins.143
Therefore, because adolescents are deficient at controlling impulses, and
often do not think about the long-term consequences of their actions, harsh
punishment will likewise have little to no deterrent effect on this group of
people.
136. Brief for Am. Psychological Ass'n & Mo. Psychological Ass'n as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, supra note 46, at *31. See also Brief for Juvenile Law Ctr. et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 135, at *42-43 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
571 (2005)). The brief points out that harsh punishment does not have a deterrent effect on
juveniles because, due to their heightened risk-taking, juveniles do not weigh the alternatives to
their decisions before acting. Id.
137. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that executing the mentally
disabled serves no deterrent or retributive purpose and that it exceeded the Eighth Amendment).
138. Id.
139. Id at 318.
140. Id at 320.
141. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).
142. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
143. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
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C Medical Decision Making: Adolescent Autonomy and Decision Making
Capacity
Typically, adolescents are not considered capable of making medical
decisions under United States law. 144 One reason for this alleged
incapability results from parens patriae; as described earlier, this
paternalistic doctrine is premised on looking out for the "best interests of
the child."1 45
In contrast, an international consensus exists under Article 12 of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child stating that a child should have the
opportunity to express his or her views in all matters affecting the child. 146
Although the international community believes that children should be
given deference by appropriately balancing the child's age and maturity, the
United States maintains a paternalistic approach regarding medical decision
making and has yet to ratify the treaty.147
In the U.S., the relatively few exceptions to this paternalistic rule are:
emancipation,148 emergency,149 and the mature minor doctrine, which often
applies to abortions. 150 Emancipated minors are able to make medical
decisions because their legal status demonstrates the capability to make
decisions without parental consent.151 While emancipation recognizes
adolescent autonomy, the emergency exception was instituted to protect
doctors from legal liability, not in recognition of adolescents' decision
making capacity.152
The mature minor doctrine allows adolescents who demonstrate an
adult-level of maturity to make decisions that are traditionally reserved
144. Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Decisional Autonomy for Medical Care: Physician
Perceptions and Practices, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 87, 91 (2001).
145. See Ann Eileen Driggs, Note, The Mature Minor Doctrine: Do Adolescents Have the
Right to Die?, 11 HEALTH MATRIX 687, 690 (2001) (describing how the law characterizes
children as lacking maturity, and that the love a parent has for his or her child will cause the
parent to choose the medical decision that is in the best interests of the child); see also Hartman,
supra note 144, at 91 (noting that at the core of "this paternalistic approach to adolescence is the
idea that juveniles lack decisional capability and hence responsibility and accountability attendant
for their acts . . . .").
146. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 12, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S 48.
147. Id.; Press Release, United Nations, Somalia and US Should Ratify UN Child's Rights
Treaty - Official, (Oct. 13, 2010),
available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=36428&CR=children&CRl.
148. Andrew Newman, Adolescent Consent to Routine Medical and Surgical Treatment, A
Proposal to Simplify the Law of Teenage Medical Decision-Making, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 501, 504
(2001).
149. Id.
150. Driggs, supra note 145, at 690.
151. Id. at 691.
152. Id. at 690-91.
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exclusively for adults. 153 Most often the mature minor doctrine is applied
only after an adolescent has engaged in typical adult-like behavior, such as
pregnancy or marriage.1 54 For example, following the decision in Bellotti v.
Baird,155 courts began applying this doctrine to adolescents seeking an
abortion. 156 The mature minor doctrine also applies when the adolescent's
conduct may have a public health impact. 157 For example, adolescents are
able to obtain contraception and medical treatment for sexually transmitted
diseases without parental consent.15 8 Notably, this exception results from
concerns over public health, rather than a conclusion that adolescents
possess unusual maturity relative to sexual matters.1 59 This exception
"promotes adolescent access to treatment, preventing spread of the disease
by eliminating the deterrent of having to inform a parent or guardian of
sexual activity."' 60
While the mature minor doctrine accounts for an adolescent's ability to
seek medical treatment for reproductive rights, it has rarely been applied to
allow adolescents to consent or refuse life-sustaining treatment. 161 Life-
sustaining treatment is medical care rendered for a terminally ill patient or
any situation in which an individual requires medical care to sustain
viability.162
1. Legal Background of End-of-Life Decision Making and the Role of the
Adolescent
The case law regarding end-of-life decision making is limited. In 1990,
the Supreme Court was faced with a right to die case. 163 In Cruzan v.
153. Id. at 696-97.
154. Elisa Poncz, Rethinking Child Advocacy After Roper v. Simmons: "Kids are Just
Different" and "Kids are Like Adults" Advocacy Strategies, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS
J. 273, 292-93 (2008).
155. 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (holding that where a state requires an adolescent to obtain
parental consent prior to an abortion, that adolescent may bypass parental consent with a hearing
before a judge by demonstrating that she is fully aware of the consequences and that the abortion
is truly in her best interests).
156. Newman, supra note 148, at 507.
157. Poncz, supra note 154, at 293.
158. Newman, supra note 148, at 507.
159. Hartman, supra note 144, at 88.
160. Id.
161. Driggs, supra note 145, at 696.
162. Robert F. Weir & Charles Peters, Affirming the Decisions Adolescents Make About Life
and Death, 27 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov-Dec. 1997, at 29, 30 (illustrating cases of patients
prolonging life with life-sustaining treatment).
163. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). Prior to Cruzan, the New
Jersey Supreme Court dealt with the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment in the case of In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). The New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that the right
to privacy granted an incompetent person the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment through a
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Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Court held the Due Process
Clause allows for competent adults who are able to fully express their
wishes to end life-sustaining medical treatment. 164 Courts have been
reluctant to grant a similar right to minors believing that adolescents are not
competent to make end-of-life decisions. 165 Doctors and parents may
involve the minor in discussions about end-of-life decisions, but in most
cases the minor's preferences are honored only when the parents agree. 166
Some jurisdictions acknowledge the importance of the mature minor
doctrine, and have allowed mature adolescents to refuse life-sustaining
treatment. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court's holding in In re
E.G. 167 held that minors may decide to discontinue life-sustaining treatment
if clear and convincing evidence establishes the minor is fully cognizant of
the consequences surrounding the decision.16 8 The Court did not rely on
scientific studies, but reasoned that the state's parens patriae interest is
greater when the minor is younger and presumptively more immature, but
the parens patriae interest gradually diminishes as the minor gets older.169
Similar to the general trend of case law, most state statutory provisions do
not directly vest minors with the right to consent to or terminate life-
sustaining treatment. 170 Although not referencing life-sustaining treatment
guardian. Id. at 664. Although the Court did not grant removal of Quinlan's respirator, the Court
did grant a new guardian and authorized this person to find new physicians who would not be
prohibited from withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. Id. at 671.
164. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 286-87.
165. Driggs, supra note 145, at 694. End of life decisions allow a person the right to control
choices about their own life and death. Charmaine D. Caldwell & Stephen Freedman, End-of-Life
Decision Making: A Slippery Slope, 37 J. PROF. COUNSELING, PRAC., THEORY & RES. 21, 21
(2009).
166. COMM. ON PALLIATIVE & END-OF-LIFE CARE FOR CHILDREN & THEIR FAMILIES, INST.
OF MED., WHEN CHILDREN DIE: IMPROVING PALLIATIVE AND END-OF-LIFE CARE FOR CHILDREN
AND THEIR FAMILIES 130-31 (Marilyn J. Field & Richard E. Behrman eds., 2003). (explaining
that little information is available to advise doctors dealing with families whose children are
facing life threatening conditions).
167. 549 N.E.2d 322, 327-28 (Ill. 1989).
168. See id. at 328 (noting that the right granted to the adolescent must be evaluated in light of
the "State's interests: (1) the preservation of life; (2) protecting the interests of third parties; (3)
prevention of suicide; and (4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession.").
169. Id at 327.
170. See generally HAW. REV. STAT. ANN § 577A-2 (LexisNexis 2010) (stating that no
parental consent is needed for treatment for pregnancy or venereal disease); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 2 10/1 (West 2011) (stating that no parental consent is needed for pregnant minors, married
minors, or minors who are parents); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN. § 20-102 (LexisNexis 2009)
(stating that an adolescent can have the same decision making power as an adult in the medical
area when the adolescent is married or a parent); N.J. STAT. ANN. §9:17A-1 (West 2002) (stating
that unmarried pregnant minor does not need parental consent for medical procedures relating to
the pregnancy, but needs parental consent for all other medical procedures); 35 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 10101 (West 2003) (stating that minors can pursue their own medical treatment if they
have graduated high school, have married, or have been pregnant).
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specifically, many states allow minors to consent to medical treatment
absent parental consent where the adolescent is emancipated, pregnant, or a
parent.' 7 ' In contrast, New York's Public Health Statute § 2994-e provides
not only that an emancipated minor has the ability to make their own
decisions regarding life-sustaining treatment, but where a minor
demonstrates the decision making capacity to choose to withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining treatment, the parent's choice to the contrary
cannot be implemented without the consent of the adolescent. 172
171. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
172. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-e (McKinney Supp. 2011) provides:
1. Authority of parent or guardian. The parent or guardian of a minor patient
shall have the authority to make decisions about life-sustaining treatment,
including decisions to withhold or withdraw such treatment ....
2. Decision-making standards and procedures for minor patient.
(a) The parent or guardian of a minor patient shall make decisions in
accordance with the minor's best interests . . . taking into account the
minor's wishes as appropriate under the circumstances.
(b) An attending physician, in consultation with a minor's parent or
guardian, shall determine whether a minor patient has decision-making
capacity for a decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment.
If the minor has such capacity, a parent's or guardian's decision to
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment for the minor may not be
implemented without the minor's consent.
(c) Where a parent or guardian of a minor patient has made a decision to
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment and an attending
physician has reason to believe that the minor patient has a parent or
guardian who has not been informed of the decision, including a non-
custodial parent or guardian, an attending physician or someone acting
on his or her behalf, shall make reasonable efforts to determine if the
uninformed parent or guardian has maintained substantial and
continuous contact with the minor and, if so, shall make diligent efforts
to notify that parent or guardian prior to implementing the decision.
3. Decision-making standards and procedures for emancipated minor patient.
(a) If an attending physician determines that a patient is an emancipated
minor patient with decision-making capacity, the patient shall have the
authority to decide about life-sustaining treatment. Such authority shall
include a decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment if an
attending physician and the ethics review committee determine that the
decision accords with the standards for surrogate decisions for adults,
and the ethics review committee approves the decision.
(b) If the hospital can with reasonable efforts ascertain the identity of the
parents or guardian of an emancipated minor patient, the hospital shall
notify such persons prior to withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment pursuant to this subdivision.
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2. Informed Consent Can Lead to Rational Decisions in Medical Decision
Making
Informed consent in the medical decision making context is defined as
the ability to consent to treatment knowingly and voluntarily, after
receiving sufficient information regarding the treatment. 173 The following
attributes are important for a decision maker to have when making a
medical decision: 1) understanding the circumstances surrounding the
decision, 2) the ability to think about alternatives to the decision, and 3)
ability to communicate his or her decision to others. 174 Researchers suggest
that an adolescent's capacity for medical decision making is based on the
ability to perceive the consequences of the decision, the understanding of
medical disclosure, ability to make a decision in his or her best interests,
and the ability to understand the importance attached to the decision.175
Medical literature suggests that adolescents at the age of fourteen are
capable of making rational decisions about their medical treatment.176 One
author notes that an adolescent in need of palliative care will often times
already have gained a rapport with his or her doctor.1 77 Because of this
relationship, the adolescent will likely be competent to discuss medical
treatment decisions with the doctor. 178 Physicians can "play an active role
in cultivating decision-making capacity in seriously ill adolescents through
listening, addressing concerns, and providing counsel as they are helped to
understand their options."' 79
Further research suggests that most adolescents want to participate in
end-of-life decision making. 8 0
Most adolescents who want to participate in the
decisionmaking process ... especially in regard to
decisions about life-sustaining medical interventions ...
173. Timothy J. Paterick et al., Medical Informed Consent: General Considerations for
Physicians, 83 MAYO CLINIC PROCS. 313, 313 (2008).
174. THE HASTINGS CTR., GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 7 (1987).
175. David R. Freyer, Care of the Dying Adolescent: Special Considerations, 113 PEDIATRICS
381, 383 (2004).
176. See generally Mutcherson, supra note 4, at 287-88 (acknowledging that by the age of
fourteen some adolescents demonstrate adult-like competence); Debbie Schachter et al., Informed
Consent and Adolescents, 50 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 534, 538 (2005) (noting that some adolescents
are capable of medical decision making by age fourteen).
177. Freyer, supra note 175, at 384.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Maureen E. Lyon et al., What Do Adolescents Want? An Exploratory Study Regarding
End-of-Life Decision-making, 35 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 529.el, 529.e5 (2004). Researchers
created a twenty-five question self reporting survey and subsequently administered it to twenty-
five chronically ill teenagers and twenty-five healthy teenagers. Id. at 529.e2.
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[have] experienced years of physical and psychological
suffering ... probably observed the suffering and dying of
several hospitalized friends with similar medical problems,
these adolescent patients are frequently mature beyond
chronological years. They have had, at the very least,
multiple opportunities to think about the inescapable
suffering that characterizes their lives, the features of life
that make it worth continuing, the benefit and burdens that
accompany medical treatment, and the prospect of death.181
Some scholars suggest that incorporating advanced directives into the
informed consent process for adolescents facing end-of-life decisions would
not only recognize adolescent autonomy but would also provide legal
protection for the treating doctor.182
3. Formalized Process and Procedure in End-of-Life Decision Making
Eliminates the Risk ofImpulsivity or Risk-Taking.
End-of-life decision making is a very structured and formalized
process.183 Different treatment care plans arise from the diagnosis of a life-
threatening condition. 184 Some care plans will include curative or life-
prolonging treatments, while other plans will focus on palliative care.185
The Institute of Medicine of the National Academies advocates for care
plans that integrate both life-prolonging treatments and palliative care. 186
Crucial to all care plans is re-evaluation of goals and the treatment plan
itself.187 Adolescents in the midst of end-of-life decisions have numerous
people to turn to for advice and guidance.' 88 "Depending on the situation,
physicians, nurses, social workers, psychologists, child-life specialists,
chaplains, and others will have roles to play" in advising and assessing the
minor's end-of-life goals.189 These individuals are directed by practice
181. Weir & Peters, supra note 162, at 34.
182. Id at 36 (noting that three different goals would be enhanced through incorporating
advanced directives into the informed consent process with adolescents: 1) providing adolescent
autonomy and empowerment; 2) indicating to physicians what the patient wants regarding end of
life care and providing proof of patient's wishes; and 3) enabling the parent to see what the child
truly wants).
183. See generally COMM. ON PALLIATIVE & END-OF-LIFE CARE FOR CHILDREN & THEIR
FAMILIES, supra note 166, at 8, 129 (describing the individualized care plans focused on palliative
versus life-prolonging care and the continuous re-evaluation of these plans by the numerous
professionals present during end-of-life decision making) .
184. Id. at 85.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 85-87.
187. Id at 87.
188. Id. at 129.
189. Id.
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guidelines and protocols that define their advising roles to adolescents
during end-of-life decision making.190 Additionally, almost all hospitals
have an ethics committee that can provide further guidance with end-of-life
decisions. 191
When the decision is made to move towards an inpatient palliative care
program, an individual care plan and regular care team (consisting of the
people listed above) are formed. 192 The team may include a palliative care
consultant. 193 The palliative care consultant assists the family and
adolescent patient understand their available options (e.g., transitioning to
hospice care, "starting or not starting mechanical ventilation"). 194 The
consultant also assists with evaluating the goals for end-of-life care, aids the
patient with re-evaluating the care plan, and helps with transitions to
hospice care if necessary. 195
III. HARMONIZING IMPLICATIONS OF JUVENILE AUTONOMY WITHIN THE
DIFFERENT LEGAL REALMS
Is it possible to rationalize reduced adolescent responsibility in the
criminal justice system while having increased responsibility in other
aspects of the legal system? As noted earlier, ample debate surrounds
adolescent treatment in the criminal justice system, and many strongly
advocate for adult-like treatment. 196 For those who advocate for mitigated
treatment within the criminal justice system, the question becomes what
level of treatment should the adolescent be given when it comes to medical
decision making?' 97 Recent studies on adolescent risk-taking and
impulsivity conducted by experts in adolescent cognitive development
inform the view that juveniles can be afforded differing levels of
responsibility in different legal situations. 198 These different levels of
190. Id. at 229.
191. Id at 208 n.9.
192. Id at 209.
I93. Id.
194. Id
195. Id.
196. Newman, supra note 148, at 501.
197. Id.
198. See generally Donald L. Beschle, Cognitive Dissonance Revisited: Roper v. Simmons
and the Issue of Adolescent Decision-Making Competence, 52 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 40 (2006)
(discussing adolescent decision making competence post-Roper and exploring the idea of
assigning adolescents different levels of decision making authority based on the situation);
Mutcherson, supra note 2, at 18 (examining the competence of adolescents in health care decision
making and criminal responsibility); Mutcherson, supra note 4, at 288, 302-03 (recognizing
adolescent decision making competence in some areas and not others, and arguing for adolescent
autonomy in the health care decision making context); Steinberg et al., supra note 123, at 592-93
(exploring the differences in the American Psychological Association's amicus briefs in Hodgson
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responsibility are based on the type of decision, and more importantly, on
the circumstances of each situation.199 Research conducted by Steinberg et
al., asserts that adolescents demonstrate cognitive abilities similar to adults
in some situations, but lack maturity relative to adults in other situations. 200
The abilities to engage in logical reasoning and comprehend
information are important to cognitive decision making. 201 With respect to
these aspects, by sixteen an adolescent's ability to engage in cognitive
decision making is comparable to an adult.202 Some studies even suggest
that adolescents are capable of engaging in cognitive decision making as
early as fourteen. 203 Despite cognitive maturity, scholars assert that an
adolescent's judgment when making decisions is influenced by the delayed
maturation of their psychosocial abilities.204
For an adolescent, the decision to commit a crime and the decision of
whether to consent to or refuse life-sustaining treatment are very
different.205 An adolescent's decision making capacity is decision and
context specific. 206 Because of the circumstances surrounding criminal
activity, decisions to engage in criminal activity are often spontaneous,
and Roper and arguing that the arguments in both briefs are accurate because adolescents are
capable of making abortion decisions, but that low psychosocial maturity mitigates criminal
culpability).
199. Steinberg et al., supra note 123, at 592.
200. Id. at 586. The researchers analyzed the alleged differences in the American
Psychological Association's amicus briefs on adolescent abortion in Hodgson v. Minnesota and
the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons. Id. To reconcile this problem, the authors
examined both cognitive and psychosocial factors relating to executive functioning and
intellectual abilities in a research sample. Id. at 585-87. The results of the study demonstrated that
"the question of whether adolescents are as mature as adults depends on the aspects of maturity
under consideration." Id. at 592. Researchers concluded that the situations involving abortion and
criminal conduct are different, as are the circumstances surrounding these situations. Id This
comment relies on the research study conducted by Steinberg et al., to argue that the exceedingly
structured environment surrounding end-of-life decision making provides adolescents the
opportunity to use their cognitive capabilities. Similarities exist between end-of-life decision
making and the decision to obtain an abortion in that both involve adult supervision and some
deliberation. There are however, some situations where the decision to obtain an abortion can
occur in an impulsive manner. Id. at 586. End-of-life decision making, on the other hand, involves
a very long, formalized process where adolescents have the benefit to consult with numerous
experts, the oversight of ethics committees and often first-hand experience with life-sustaining
treatment. COMM. ON PALLIATIVE & END-OF-LIFE CARE FOR CHILDREN & THEIR FAMILIES,
supra note 166, at 129.
201. Steinberg, supra note 22, at 55.
202. Steinberg et al., supra note 123, at 592.
203. Freyer, supra note 175, at 383.
204. Steinberg et al., supra note 123, at 592.
205. Id. at 586 (explaining that "the legal issues [of abortion vs. engaging in criminal behavior
are different] . . . but so are the circumstances surrounding abortion decisions and criminal
behavior, and therefore, the relevant dimensions along which adolescents and adults should be
compared differ as well.").
206. Schachter et al., supra note 176, at 534.
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impulsive, and only take into account the short-term positives. 207 In
contrast, end-of-life decision making, specifically consenting to or refusing
life-sustaining treatment, involves first-hand experience of using life-
sustaining treatment.208 Adolescents with life-threatening illnesses will
often have a realistic view of death because of their personal
experiences.209 Most importantly, the circumstances surrounding these
decisions are structured and involve informed consent.210 Additionally,
these decisions are made in consultation with a team of experts, and in most
cases these professionals have been involved in the decision making
process from the time of the life-threatening diagnosis. 211 Informed consent
and the active participation of the health care professional team prevent
impulsive action by ensuring the decision maker is fully aware of both the
consequences of the decision and the possible alternatives. 212 Informed
consent and the structured environment provided by health care
professionals points to a crucial difference between a situation involving
criminal activity and the very important decision of consenting to or
discontinuing life-sustaining treatment. 213
As previously discussed, research demonstrates that adolescents in
situations involving social and emotional arousal deficiently consider the
long-term consequences of an action and lack the ability to consider the
alternatives to a decision. 214 Hence, because criminal situations require
hasty responses, adolescents are at risk for making poor decisions. 215 These
circumstances make adolescents most vulnerable to the psychosocial factors
of peer pressure, risk-taking, impulsivity and difficulty with future goal
orientation.2 16 Informed consent and the controlled circumstances
207. Steinberg et al., supra note 123, at 586.
208. See Weir & Peters, supra note 162, at 34.
209. Freyer, supra note 175, at 382.
210. Id at 384 (discussing the physician's role in communicating, listening, responding to
concerns and explaining different treatment options).
211. See COMM. ON PALLIATIVE & END-OF-LIFE CARE FOR CHILDREN & THEIR FAMILIES,
supra note 166, at 104 (noting that doctors, nurses, social workers and other health care
professionals have prominent roles following a child's diagnosis with a life threatening condition).
212. Schachter et al., supra note 176, at 535.
213. See Steinberg et al., supra note 123, at 592 (explaining the difference between decisions
made where "emotional and social influences on judgment are minimized" and where the
adolescent has the opportunity to confer with a responsible authority figure versus a situation
where "characterized by high levels of emotional arousal and social coercion, or that do not
encourage or permit consultation with an expert .... ).
214. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
215. See Steinberg et al., supra note 123, at 592 (noting that with reference to decisions
involving abortion and engaging in criminal activity "it seems reasonable to distinguish between
two very different decision-making contexts in this regard: those that allow for unhurried, logical
reflection and those that do not.").
216. Id.
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surrounding end-of-life decision making make up for the inadequacies in
the psychosocial maturity of adolescents.
The decision to maintain or cease life-sustaining treatment is a
deliberate decision requiring logical reasoning and comprehension
abilities. 217 Research has demonstrated that adolescents who are at least
sixteen are capable of these abilities and some studies suggest adolescents
who are fourteen are capable of these abilities as well. 218 End-of-life
decision making requires extensive thought and is a decision that is not
made spur of the moment. 219 The context for end-of-life decision making is
significantly different than the context for criminal activity. The most
obvious actors involved in end-of-life decision making are parents, but even
if parents are minimally involved in the decision, the adolescent's doctor is
required to obtain the informed consent of the adolescent. 220 Additionally,
as described earlier, aside from parents and doctors, adolescents have
numerous other professionals available to advise and assess the minor's
end-of-life goals.221 Also discussed earlier, adolescents with life-
threatening illnesses typically establish a relationship with their treating
physician, which further assists the adolescent to obtain an intelligent
perspective on the situation.222 "As patients mature during adolescence,
they become capable of more abstract thinking and can comprehend more
complex aspects of their situations." 223 Scholars advocate the importance of
enhancing autonomy and making adolescents feel involved in the decision
making process. 224 Scholars also argue that "[o]lder adolescents having
greater functional competence should be given a more central role in their
decisions from the beginning."225
End-of-life decision making varies incredibly from the types of
decisions that adolescents Simmons and Graham engaged in when each of
them chose to commit criminal acts. Decisions to commit a crime almost
217. See Freyer, supra note 175, at 383 (describing that the cognitive abilities necessary to
engage in competent decision making are reasoning, making choices without the influence of
parents and understanding the importance and seriousness of the decision).
218. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
219. See generally COMM. ON PALLIATIVE & END-OF-LIFE CARE FOR CHILDREN & THEIR
FAMILIES, supra note 166, at 321 (discussing that end-of-life decision making involves extensive
guidance from numerous professionals, and at times conflicts on the correct course of treatment
can arise between parents, children and health care professionals).
220. See Freyer, supra note 175, at 384 (expressing the important and influential role the
doctor plays in the decision making of the adolescent).
221. COMM. ON PALLIATIVE & END-OF-LIFE CARE FOR CHILDREN & THEIR FAMILIES, supra
note 166, at 129.
222. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
223. Freyer, supra note 175, at 385.
224. Mutcherson, supra note 4, at 300-01.
225. Freyer, supra note 175, at 386.
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always occur "in situations that elicit impulsivity, that are typically
characterized by high levels of emotional arousal or social coercion, or that
do not encourage or permit consultation with an expert who is more
knowledgeable or experienced."226 All of these factors render adolescents,
who are already vulnerable to risk-taking and impulsive behavior, more
vulnerable to engaging in antisocial behavior.227 Because juvenile crime
usually occurs without adults present, situations where adolescents can
consult with a responsible adult and become informed of the consequences
of engaging in criminal activity are rare.228 Adolescents, who are already
emotionally and socially immature, become more vulnerable in these
situations, accounting in part for the separate juvenile justice system.229
Although in recent years, more adolescents have been automatically placed
in the adult criminal justice system230 current case law supports the once
held belief that adolescents are different than adults.231 It is important to
note that low psychosocial maturity is the distinction that renders juveniles
less culpable in the criminal justice system.
In contrast, cognitive maturity and its relation to the structured
circumstances of the medical decision make adolescents more responsible
in this decision making context. 232 The Supreme Court's reliance on
scientific studies in analyzing adolescent psychosocial maturity in Roper
and Graham is particularly telling.233 The Supreme Court used these
studies to mitigate adolescent culpability in Roper v. Simmons and then
most recently relied on these studies again in Graham v. Florida, indicating
226. Steinberg et al., supra note 123, at 592.
227. See Brief for Juvenile Law Ctr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note
135, at *46 (quoting ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE
JUSTICE 49 (2008)) (explaining that "adolescents' executive functions are not mature, their
capacities for planning, for anticipating future consequences, and for impulse control are deficient
- - as compared with those of adults - - at a time when their inclination to engage in risk-taking
behavior in the company of peers is greater than it will be in a few years.").
228. See Steinberg, supra note 22, at 56 (describing that adolescents are "oriented toward
peers"); see also Steinberg et al., supra note 123, at 592 (describing an adolescent's vulnerability
in criminal situations because these situations are characterized by peer pressure and emotional
arousal).
229. Steinberg, supra note 22, at 50 (explaining that proponents of a separate juvenile justice
system were fueled by the belief that adolescents are developmentally different from adults).
230. Scott & Grisso, supra note 38, at 150.
231. See supra notes 92, 103-8, 120-21 and accompanying text.
232. See supra Part l.C.2.
233. Johanna Cooper Jennings, Note, Juvenile Justice, Sullivan and Graham: How the
Supreme Court's Decision Will Change the Neuroscience Debate, DUKE L. & TECH. REV., May
18, 2010, at1 22, available at http://www.law.duke.edu/joumals/dltr/articles/pdfl20 I OdltrOO6.pdf
(stating that if the Graham court "does choose to implement a categorical ban, the door for
neuroscience research opened in Roper will remain open for juvenile advocates to further reform
the system in the future.").
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that the Court is starting to believe that juveniles are deserving of different
treatment in the criminal context. 234
CONCLUSION
This article analyzed the inconsistencies involved in adolescent
decision making autonomy. 235 First, this article focused on the new
developments in neuroscience and psychology that reveal a scientific
justification for the typical "reckless teenager." 236 Support for using science
as the decisive factor in determining how much responsibility an adolescent
should have has not escaped criticism. 237  The best approach for
determining adolescent responsibility in any given legal realm is to consider
developmental science.238 New research indicating adolescent tendency for
impulsive behavior should be viewed in conjunction with the circumstances
surrounding the legal decision being made.239
Adolescents should be give decision making autonomy in end-of-life
decision making because these decisions are structured, do not require
immediate response and allow the adolescent time and resources to become
informed of all possible consequences and alternatives. 240 Like most health
care decisions, this type of decision involves informed consent.24 1 Thus, the
adolescent's decision making will be structured and guided by formalized
processes and extensive consultation with informed professionals over
time.242 Therefore, the adolescent will become aware of all possible
consequences to make a knowledgeable, reflective decision. 243 Contrarily,
scenarios involving criminal activity lend themselves to impulsive and
reckless behavior.244 Adolescents in these situations need to think fast, and
do not have the benefit of an authority figure weighing the costs and
234. Id.
235. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (outlining the various views that exist
regarding the autonomy that adolescents should be accorded in criminal and medical decision
making contexts).
236. See supra Part 1.
237. See Maroney, supra note 124, at 93 (writing that neuroscience on adolescent brain
development should be used as only one factor when determining the culpability and legal
responsibility of an adolescent). See also William J. Katt, Roper and the Scientific Amicus 49
JURIMETRICS J. 253, 254-55, 274 (2009) (questioning the Supreme Court's reliance on science
presented through advocacy in amicus briefs not subject to cross-examination).
238. See supra Part I (detailing the neurological make-up that both increases and decreases
adolescents' abilities to make reasoned decisions).
239. See supra notes 70-75 & 173-75 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 173-81 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes' 179-81 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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benefits for them.245 Because of this reality, adolescents should have
reduced culpability in the criminal justice system.246 In recent cases the
Supreme Court has looked to studies in neuroscience and psychology to
mitigate adolescent responsibility in the justice system.247 As more
advances in scientific studies become available, it is likely that science will
continue to inform the Supreme Court and policy makers.
When determining adolescent responsibility, the circumstances of
crime and susceptibility of adolescents to engage in crime renders them less
culpable than adults. The circumstances surrounding end-of-life decision
making are much more forgiving of adolescent psychosocial immaturity
and provide circumstances where adolescents can use their cognitive
capabilities.
245. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
246. See supra Part III.
247. See supra Part II.A.
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